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Catholic Ethical Teaching and Public Policy: 
How Do They Relate? 
Dennis J. Horan, Esq. 
and 
Edward R. Grant 
This was the kernOle address presented at a con("erence entitled 
" Withhol.;.'ing and Withdrawing Artificial Sustenance: Catholic Ethical 
Teaching and Public Policy". at the Bioethics Institute at St. Francis 
Hospital. Miami Beach, Florida. March 14. 1986. 
During the last several years, the issue of providing nutrition and 
hydration to patients who are terminally ill, permanently comatose, or 
otherwise severely impaired , has engaged a great deal of commentary in 
journals of medicine and medical ethics. More importantly, the issue has 
been addressed in many legal forums, both state legislatures and courts. In 
Florida, there are two important legal developments: passage of the "Life-
Prolonging Proced ures Act" in 1984, and the pending litigation of Corbell 
v. D'Allessandro before the Court of Appeals in the second judicial 
district. I n that case, the trial court refused to permit the removal of a 
feeding tube from a comatose woman. The court held tlhat to do so would 
be contrary to the 1984 act, which excludes nutrition and hydration from 
the category of medical treatments which can be removed from a patient 
who has executed a "living will". The Corbett case has attracted wide 
attention because it is the first test of whether the safeguards built into 
living will legislation may be applied even to those patients who have not 
signed a living will. 
The Corbett case and the Life-Prolonging Procedures Act of Florida 
form a helpful background to our discussion. This is true not only because 
these legal developments directly confront the issue of nutrition and 
hydration , which is the subject of this conference, but also because of the 
involvement and influence which the Florida Catholic Conference had 
during the enactment of the Life-Prolonging Procedures Act. 
A decade ago, when living will statutes were first proposed, the Catholic 
Church was virtually unanimous in its opposition. Even theologians who 
have a relatively liberal reputation on issues of medical ethics, such as 
Fathers John Paris and Richard McCormick, did not support these bills. 
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That position has changed, for a number of reasons, to one of modified 
opposition, which includes attempting to amend living will proposals with 
safeguards to prevent such bills from becoming a foot in the door to the 
legalization of euthanasia. My purpose is not to examine the reasons or the 
wisdom of the strategy which has apparently been adopted by the Catholic 
conferences in this and in several other states, however. 
Death Legislation Desirable? 
The enactment of death legislaiion may not be a desirable course of 
action. However. if such legislation is offered in a dangerous form which 
may legalize mercy-killing, it is the duty of those who serve the Church's 
mission in the legislative arena to attempt to amend that proposal. Such 
attempts may not always be successful. They may also be erroneously 
interpreted as support for the pro-euthanasia ideology that sees such 
legislation as a first step toward more liberal public policy on the question 
of euthanasia. Nevertheless, when it comes to making difficult. strategic 
decisions either in the legislature or the courtroom, absolute purity of 
doctrine is impossible to maintain. The dilemma is this: how does one 
represent the mission of the Church in the creation of public policy which 
must be applied to a secular society which is, in important respects, only 
nominally Christian. 
A Perplexing Problem 
This is the problem which confronts and perplexes Catholics as the 
Church becomes increasingly involved in a wide range of political issues. 
The issue we address here could likewise be addressed in connection with a 
number of social and political issues: abortion, capital punishment, aid to 
private schools, nuclear weapons. 
Religion/Public Policy Interplay 
Yet. there are some unique aspects to the interplay between religion and 
public policy on the issues of mercy-killing and the provision of life-
sustaining treatment. Catholic families are disproportionately represented 
in the cases which have received public notoriety: Karen Quinlan, Paul 
Brophy, Claire Conroy and Brother Fox. All were practicing Catholics. 
Moreover. those who sought the removal of treatment from these patients 
made it well known that their decision had been arrived at after prayer and 
lengthy discussion with pastors. 
Even more significant than these personal factors is the role which 
Catholic moral teaching appears to play in the formation of judicial 
opinions on this subject. This can first be seen in the Quinlan case. Bishop 
Lawrence Casey of the Paterson Diocese issued a statement of instruction 
to the faithful of his diocese supporting the position of the Quinlan family 
on the basis of the Church's traditional distinction between ordinary and 
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extraordinary means of treatment. This statement was made part of the 
record through a friend of court brief filed by the New Jersey Catholic 
Conference. It is apparent in reading the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
opinion that Chief Justice Hughes (also a Catholic), took no small comfort 
from the Church's endorsement of the family's position. 
Illumination of Problems 
A short discussion of the Catholic Conference brief, and the resulting 
opinion of the New Jersey Court , may illuminate some of the problems 
that we face now, a decade after that opinion. 
I n his statement, Bishop Casey clearly reiterated the Church's stance 
against euthanasia. This is the stance which is reflected in the 1980 Vatican 
Declara tion on Euthanasia. It is also adhered to by virtually all Roman 
Catholic theologians. (I am not considering here the clear dissenters from 
Church teaching on this issue). 
Likewise, Bishop Casey instructed his flock (and, eventually, the court) 
in the application of extraordinary means analysis to the specifics of Karen 
Quinlan's position. Again, his writing in this area was straightforward, 
orthodox, and non-controversial. 
One cannot apply these same three adjectives to the opinion of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court. That opinion has received extensive analysis , and 
our intention here is to focus upon that aspect of the opinion which 
pertains to the legalization of euthanasia. In short, the court rejected the 
arguments of prosecutors and the attorney general of the state that 
removal of Miss Quinlan's respirator would constitute homicide, and 
accepted Bishop Casey's argument that it would not. Even if the removal 
could be considered a homicide, the court ruled, it could not be subject to 
prosecution because of the protection offered by the patient's 
constitutional right of privacy. , 
Scholars in law and ethics were quick to spot the potential consequences 
of this inventive line of legal reasoning. Yale Kamisar of the University of 
Michigan, one of the foremost scholars and champions of civil liberties in 
the nation, criticized the popular view of Quinlan as a right-to-die case. In 
an article in the New York Times after the death last year of Karen 
Quinlan, Professor Kamisar stated : 
It is far more accurate to view [Quinlan] as a power-to-let-someone-else-die 
case. Why? Because letting people die when you have a special relationship with 
them a nd a dut y to care for them is the equivalent of killing them .. . . Quinlan 
could not consent to her death , or ask anyone else to let her die. Nor had she made 
a ' living will' or executed any directive requesting that she be allowed to die 
without 'medical intervention.' 
The Quinlan opinion, Karmisar writes, thus badly smudged the 
distinction between the right to choose one's death, and the right to 
choose someone else's. 
One does not have to accept the totality of Kamisar's argument to 
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recognize the basic truth of his statement: that the Quinlan case, despite 
the tragic circumstances and high motives ofthe Quinlan family, had much 
to do with euthanasia. And that the Quinlan opinion, if followed to its 
logical conclusion, could provide constitutional protection for the practice 
of euthanasia. 
Mimy Lessons from Quinlan Case 
Among the many lessons of Quinlan. therefore, is that there is a great 
deal of difference between the role of the pastor or religious advisor and 
the role of the courts. What appeared to be perfectly defensible, humane 
and just in the statement of Bishop Casey, takes on a new light when stated 
under doctrines of constitutional law in the opinion of Justice Hughes . To 
a large degree, this difference is a difference of constituencies. In exercising 
his teaching authority, Bishop Casey is addressing a religious community 
which shares the presumptions of the sanctity of human life. More 
specifically, he is addressing those Catholics who, through professional 
roles or family circumstances, are facing similar circumstances. Although 
the teaching of the Church against euthanasia should be clearly stated to 
this audience, pastoral concern may temper the message so as to not 
unduly trouble the consciences of those who are facing difficult burdens. 
Chief Justice Hughes, on the other hand , was creating public policy for a 
state in excess of seven million persons who may not share the same 
religious and personal convictions. On matters of life and death, 
particularly when dealing with a vulnerable class of medical patients, 
public policy must take into account the need for clarity and line-drawing. 
To some degree, Chief Justice Hughes achieved this by limiting the relief 
granted to Mr. Quinlan and vesting the final decision on removal of the 
respirator in the attending physician. However, the legal doctrines of the 
Quinlan opinion remain open for application to a wider range of factual 
circumstances. , 
Thus it is apparent that those dealing in the intersection of theology and 
law must not only take into account the different constituencies of these 
disciplines, but also the different social and legal climates which may be 
present or forthcoming. This is plainly seen in the issue of providing 
nutrition and hydration, the issue of concern for our gathering here, and 
the issue which will now be addressed. 
There are many forces presently at work in the field of biomedical ethics. 
Among these forces are those which would weaken existing legal 
restrictions against the practice of mercy-killing, or euthanasia. 
Legislation has been drafted by the Hemlock Society in California which 
would amend that state's "Natural Death Act" to permit the direct killing 
of terminally ill patients by request. Meanwhile, courts are being asked, in 
cases like Corbett and Brophy in Massachusetts, to authorize the removal 
of feeding tubes from comatose patients. The result of this, as the trial 
court concluded in the Brophy case, will be the intentional death by 
starvation of these patients. 
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Jurists and legislators looking for guidance on these questions have 
customarily turned to the teachings ofthe Roman Catholic Church, and to 
the expert opinion of Roman Catho lic theologians. There a re two 
principal reasons for this. First, the ethics and morals of euthanasia and 
the removal of life support have received more comprehensive treatment in 
Roma n Ca tholicism than in other theological traditions. Second, the 
Church has taken a strong stance in affirmation of the preservation and 
dignity of human life , thus leading secular authorities to rely on Church 
teachings as reliable indication of what does, and does not, constitute 
eutha nasia. 
Teaching, Law in Accord 
Church teaching and Anglo-American law have been in total accord in 
their condemnation of mercy killing, whether by active or passive means. 
The 1980 Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia states the following: " By 
euthanasia is understood an action or omission which of itself or by 
intention causes death , in order that all suffering may in this way be 
eliminated. Euthanasia's terms of reference, therefore, are to be found in 
the intention of the will and in the methods used ." 
Similarly, the law of homicide makes no exception for compassionate 
motive" or "death by benign neglect." Every intentional killing of a human 
being must be covered under the homicide law, for once an exception to 
that law is created, the law of homicide ceases to exist as to certain 
unprotected persons in our society, such as the mentally retarded, the 
senile, the infirm and the aged. Nevertheless, voices within the Church and 
the legal profession are asking for a relaxation of these strictures against 
mercy-killing. 
I believe that these voices are evident in the current efforts to remove 
nutrition and hydration from the category of ordinary care that ought to 
be provided to patients as a matter of obligation. In many cases, the 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration meets all of the conditions for 
euthanasia by omission. The withdrawl is performed with the intent of 
bringing about the death of the patient, and the certainty that death will 
result. Death results not from the underlying disease, but from the 
resulting starvation of the patient. Moreover, this death is often being 
sought in cases where it is evident that the patient suffers little or no 
discomfort from the mechanism of feeding, and death is not otherwise 
imminent. 
I am not referring here to the withdrawl of futile or truly burdensome 
medical treatment, which may, in a limited number of cases , include the 
removal of nutrition and hydration. By burdensome, I mean treatment 
which itself causes unremitting pain or profound suffering to a patient 
where the hope for benefit from that treatment is very dim. However, I do 
not mean the "burden" of life itself, or the burdens to third parties. The 
removal of futile or burdensome medical treatment is licit as a matter of 
medical judgment when made in the best interests of the patient. 
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In distinguishing the removal of nutrition and hydration from other 
forms of removal of treatment, the manner of death must also be reckoned 
with. In Braph\". which is currently on appeal to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, the trial court found that death by starvation 
would have grave and inhumane physical effects upon the patient: 
hyperthermia, convulsions, retraction of the eyes into their orbits, and 
drying out and parching of the lips, mouth and skin. 
If this manner of bringing about death for certain terminally ill and 
comatose patients is morally permItted. then. In the minds 01 most 
common sense observers. the only logical alternative to causing this 
grotesque manner of dying would be to perform active euthanasia - the 
direct injection of a lethal dose of anesthesia or drugs in order to kill the 
patient painlessly but instantly. Surely, many would argue that it is more 
humane to kill painlessly than to cause the additional prolonged agony of 
death by starvation. 
Some Responses to Arguments 
Some have responded to such arguments by asserting that many 
patients will not suffer extremely by the removal of artificial means of 
nutrition and hydration, that provision offood and water in such cases is 
merely "symbolic". and that the indignity of "forced feeding" is the greater 
evil to be avoided . This thesis is becoming more prevalent in the writings 
of some Catholic ethicists, although it seems overly utilitarian for a 
Catholic viewpoint. A good response has been articulated by Daniel 
Callahan. He states that there are two important moral traditions at stake 
in the debate over providing nutrition and hydration: the general moral 
duty to feed the hungry and give water to the thirsty. and the specific 
medical duty to provide comfort and care to patients, even if nothing of 
medical value can be done for them. It is important to n~te the distinction 
that Callahan has drawn between the provision of comlort care. and the 
doing of things which might be considered to have medical value. One of 
the most vexing aspects of this entire debate is the basic disagreement over 
what we are doing when we provide food and water through mechanical 
assistance. Are we supplying an invasive, technological prolongation of life 
akin to a respirator or dialysis? Or are we meeting a basic need of all 
persons, a need which is not specifically medical? 
Although several courts have attempted to resolve this question, it is 
evident that we are a long way from any dependa ble legal consensus which 
will offer guidance to the medical profession. The same can be said of the 
literature in biomedical ethics. Although most authorities seem to hold 
that nutrition and hydration can be withdrawn in some circumstances. 
there is a significant dissenting view, expressed by men such as Dr. Mark 
Siegler of the University of Chicago, and Prof. Gilbert Meilaender of 
Oberlin College, that removal of nourishment breaches fundamental 
canons of medical ethics . 
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Callahan Comments 
Thus Daniel Callahan sympathizes with our "spontaneous revulsion" at 
the thought of cutting off food and water. "We are being asked to do 
something that goes against our deepest social and moral instincts ; that is 
why its importance is often called symbolic. Some issues are important 
because they are symbolic. Others are symbolic because they are important 
- something beyond the immediate issue at stake . I believe that is the case 
here; the larger stake is .. . the way we ... understand the role of the 
physician .... We should know that it is no light , or merely symbolic 
matter to begin tampering with traditions based on considerable 
experience and designed to provide as solid a fortress as morality can offer 
against a human propensity to neglect , to abuse, to kill the powerless , the 
burdensome, and the inconvenient." 
As Callahan's own position demonstrates, it is not necessary to be an 
absolutist on the question of withdrawing nutrition and hydration in order 
to be very concerned over the precedent that we set when we loosen the 
restrictions on such decisions. Callahan proposes that it should be 
permissible to remove food and water when a patient is imminently dying, 
or "utterly vegetative". He defends this on the same principles which are 
used to justify the removal of other forms of treatment from these patients: 
that the treatment is essentially useless since there is no possibility of 
recovery . 
Regarding other patients for whom the removal of nourishment has 
been proposed- the severely senile and incapacitated patients such as Claire 
Conroy- Callahan states: "I can see no justification for withholding food 
and water under those conditions." Since we cannot know with certainty 
what is going on in the minds of such patients, we cannot presume to make 
the judgment that the person's life is not worth sustaining. Thus, Callahan 
proposes that a very firm and sharp line be drawn at the imminently dying 
and permanently comatose. He recognizes that there is a'price for drawing 
that line, a price that may have to be paid by the prolonged suffering of 
some patients. But he encourages us to consider the burdens and benefits 
to society at large if we take the opposite course: to encourage and make 
routine the cessation of food and water to certain classes of patients. He 
asks: "What kind of society would that tend to produce, what kind of 
medical practice and medical practitioners, what kind of politics and 
attitudes towards the elderly?" 
Approach Has Difficulties 
This lengthy quotation of Daniel Callahan is not to propose his 
position as the definitive resolution to this problem. Indeed , there are 
substantial difficulties with his approach, and as we have seen with his 
analysis of the abortion issue, his willingness to embrace a looseness of 
rules in certain exceptional circumstances has led him virtually to abandon 
all protection for unborn life. However, he is one of a very small band to 
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recognize the great societal impact of lowering the standards of medical 
ethics on this issue. He recognizes, for reasons which are perhaps more 
deeply felt by the heart and conscience than easily articulated by the mind , 
that the removal of food and water is different from the removal of other 
forms of medical treatment. 
As a lawyer, 1 would go one step further than Daniel Callahan: If we 
continue to loosen strictures on the removal of nutrition and hydration, we 
will not be able to maintain our legal prohibitions against active forms of 
euthanasia. The removal of food and water will, in many cases, constitute 
euthanasia by omission - the wilfull ending of human life . As Catholic 
moralists, professionals and lay people, we may be able to satisfy ourselves 
that we have maintained a distinction, however small, between the removal 
of food and water and the practice of euthanasia . However, our society, 
which is not overwhelmingly Catholic, will not respect that distinction. If 
society witnesses the agents of Catholic health care licensing the removal of 
food and water as a more routine measure, it will not stop to listen to our 
detailed ethical justifications. 
On the contrary, it is my fear that society will morally equate the removal 
of food and water with the injection of the lethal dose. So far, this has been a 
favorite tactic of the euthanasia movement: to equate the removal of 
respirators, dialysis and other burdensome forms of treatment from the 
dying with the active forms of euthanasia. When the issue switches to food 
and water, I believe that this tactic will triumph. Society will eventually see 
the starvation of the elderly as a cruel means of hastening death , and, as a 
"humane" alternative, lobby for acceptance of the instantly effective means 
of euthanasia. 
If anyone doubts the willingness of society to move in this direction, I call 
to your attention the recent best-seller by Betty Rollin, called Last Wish. In 
that book, M iss Rollin details how she and her husband planned and carried 
out the assisted suicide of her mother. Response to the b09k, at least on the 
part of the media , was overwhelmingly favorable, so much so, I fear, that any 
legal action against M iss Rollin was ruled out. 
Concern About Theologians' Policies 
One has to be concerned, therefore, with the fact that an increasing 
number of American theologians are recommending policies which would 
permit the removal of nutrition and hydration . The concern is especially 
acute where there is a failure to carefully distinguish the cases and 
circumstances where such removal is permissible and not permissible. In 
writings and court testimony, some theologians have claimed the removal of 
food and water is to be distinguished from mercy killing, but the justification 
given for this distinction is more suited to faculties of theology than to the 
plainer discourse of law and public policy. 
Indeed, we hear more theologians speaking of the "diminished quality of 
the patient's life" as an acceptable criterion for deciding to starve the patient. 
Even "conservative" theologians who do not explicitly accept the quality of 
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life criteria, do accept factors such as financial burden to society, or the 
"psychological repugnancy" of tube feeding which , in the eyes of the law, are 
tantamount to quality of life criteria. 
In addition, this is not a problem that is limited to dissenting theologians, 
for we hear even the soundest voices in moral theology providing a rationale 
for death by starvation that could be applied yearly to thousands of patients 
in the United States. 
The impact of these teachings upon American public policy could be 
profound. The traditional ethics of medical practice in the United States has 
been submerged under the tidal wave of abortion on demand. As predicted, 
legalized abortion has led to the practice of euthanasia by omission upon 
handicapped infants. Now, we hear proposals from leading politicians that 
the elderly have a "duty to die" and get out of the way of the productive 
members of society. As a result, we cannot look to the still-developing 
profession of medical ethics to preserve our laws against mercy-killing. If the 
teaching of the Church backs away from its traditional stance against 
euthanasia by permitting death by design through starvation, the law will be 
likely to follow. The argument that it is more humane to kill painlessly and 
quickly than to subject patients to prolonged starvation could become 
overpowering. The result would be a wholesale change in the law and 
medical practice regarding mercy killing. 
Dyck's Words Relevant 
The words of Arthur Dyck, professor of medical ethics at Harvard 
University, are relevant here. Dyck states that once euthanasia is permitted 
in a small range of cases, it will gradually be applied to a wider and wider 
range of cases. This is because there is no principled way to limit the 
application of mercy killing to a narrow range of cases that are definitely 
circumscribed and carefully controlled . For example, is the case for 
euthanasia or death by removal of food and water stronger in the case of the 
comatose patient who can feel no hunger or thirst, or in the case of the cancer 
patient facing a miserable decline towards death? The list could go on and 
on. Indeed, a misapplication or the principles of distributive justice would 
lead society to demand that all who are suffering from terminal disease or 
disability be given the right to end their lives. Thus, as in the case of abortion, 
to open the door and legalize mercy killing in one case is to legalize it in a full 
range of cases that are never contemplated by the progenitors of the policy. 
F or these reasons, what appears to be even a small inroad in legal protections 
against euthanasia must be resisted. 
One must recognize, of course, that the demands of theologians and 
lawyers differ. I am aware of this distinction, and I cannot ask that the 
teaching of theology conform to the needs of the secular, materialistic world 
in which euthanasia is such a temptation. However, I do not think I am out 
of line in suggesting that, in light of the current climate, theologians must 
consider the profound nature of the public policy battle in which we are 
engaged at this time, before concluding their study of this issue. Acceptance 
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of this invitation would considerably broaden the scope of theological 
inquiry and study on these matters . It is apparent that traditional moral 
theology on such matters has focused on the question of the moral 
obligations of an individual patient to accept or reject a certain form of 
medical treatment or therapy. Today, it is apparent that this narrow scope 
of inquiry is not sufficient. The question facing the arbiters of the public 
policy is the responsibility of society to take care of those who are no longer 
capable of taking care of themselves . As we see in many facets of life, the 
temptation is very strong to diminish those responsibilities. The demise of 
those responsibilities within the medical and nursing professions, which 
have traditionally been devoted to zealous protection of the welfare of the 
individual patient, could be disastrous. 
First Step for Theologians 
As a first step, moral theologians must recognize the difference between 
the factors bearing on the moral responsibility of the individual patient, and 
those weighing upon the standards of public policy. The nuances and 
ambiguities which are often acceptable in positions of moral theology may 
only serve the cause of confusion when applied to public policy. For 
example, recent statements in moral theology suggest that the "cost to 
society" of treatment may be taken into account in deciding to terminate 
treatment. In the United States, such statements reinforce the arguments of 
the advocates of euthanasia, and may perpetuate the unproven assumption 
that the cost of caring for the elderly and infirm is a luxury which our society 
can no longer afford. There is no empirical evidence which establishes that 
the curtailment of treatment for such patients would benefit other sectors 
of society. Yet, statements to this effect by moral theologians may 
unwittingly buttress the propaganda of the euthanasia societies. 
As a second and related step, it would be helpful for theologians and the 
Church Magisterium to clarify the Church's stance toward public policy 
on this issue. In particular, in light of the attacks upon regal prohibitions 
against eutha'nasia, theologians should clarify that regardless of the precise 
moral position on the withdrawal of treatment in a particular case, it is 
acceptable for the law to maintain a stricter standard. There should be 
nothing startling about this proposal. At stake in the realm of moral 
theology is not only the preservation of Catholic doctrine, but the 
counseling and nurturing of individual souls. In order for this benefit to be 
available to all believers , teachers of moral theology must take into account 
a wide variety of circumstances. They must also avoid the error of unduly 
burdening the consciences of the faithful. 
The stakes in public policy are quite different. Law must guide and 
regulate human conduct, and to do this effectively, it must draw sharp lines. 
Even if theologians do not prefer to focus their lines with the same degree of 
clarity, they must be aware of the consequences if the law fails to do so. This 
is particularly true if theologians are to continue in their role of advising the 
courts and legislatures on acceptable public policy in this area. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would like to offer a few specific thoughts on the status 
of public policy toward the provision of nutrition and hydration. Several 
courts, notably the California Court of Appeal in Barber and the New 
Jersey Supreme Court of Appeal in Conrov. have equated these measures 
with other forms of life support. So far, the legislatures which have 
specifically addressed this issue seeem to disagree . Moreover, there are 
several other court cases in the pipeline, including Corbett here in Florida, 
and Brophl' in Massachusetts , where trial courts have refused to equate 
food and water with extraordinary medical treatment. It is thus a very 
open issue at this time. If the law is to eventually permit the removal of 
food and water, I believe that it must do so on the most narrow and 
defensible of grounds: when the patient is imminently dying, within a 
matter of hours or days, and / or the provision of nutrition and hydration 
has become useless . By "useless" I do not mean in relation to recovery from 
the underlying disease , but useless to provide nourishment itself. This 
might be the case where the patient has lost the ability to metabolize, or 
there is no available means of supplying nutrition which does not itself 
constitute an undue burden to the patient. 
Admittedly, this is a stricter standard than many of us might wish upon 
our patients. Yet, we cannot assume that our good will in advancing a 
more lax policy will be matched by all of those who will carry out this 
policy in the future . In order for us to fully meet our obligations to 
maintain the high standards of ethical practice in medicine, and to resist 
the temptations that society will offer to leagalize the practice of 
euthanasia , we must be cautious and vigilant in our proposals on questions 
such as the provision of nutrition and hydration . This is one critical aspect 
of the relationship between Catholic ethical teaching and public policy, a 
relationship whose health must be maintained with a vigor equal to that 
which we offer our clients and our patients. 
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